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John Milbank begins Theology and Social Theory,' his influential
study of the theological significance of modern social thought, with the
observation that in the beginning, the secular did not exist. It was not
even a pre-natal thought waiting to be born. Human beings were, and
are, by nature and everywhere, religious. Throughout much of European
history, they expressed their religiousness in and through the
institutions, traditions, rituals, and practices of the Abrahamic religions.
The secular emerged from this hermeneutic horizon. It was a creation of
human beings living in particular historical circumstances, responding
to particular political, social, and economic conditions. The focus of this
Symposium is the interrelationship between that form of modern,
secular political theory known as classical liberalism and the Christian
religious beliefs that were the context from which it arose.
Two extreme views frame this Symposium. At one extreme is the
view that modernity is an expression of a passage from adolescence to
adulthood. According to this view, the secular state emerged from the
naivete of childhood during the traumas of the Wars of Religion of the
late 1 7 th and early 18h centuries.2 By the end of 1 8 th century, a cautious
acceptance of adulthood was worked out in the reception of modernity
as a more responsible and competent condition than what had preceded
it. The genesis of the modern liberal democratic state marked a triumph
that was not fully achieved until the adoption of the United States
Constitution, which became the institutionalized embodiment of an
agreement among responsible adults to live as adults in a world stripped

1. JOHN MILBANK, THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY: BEYOND SECULAR REASON 9-10

(Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
2. For the view of modernity as an escape from childhood, see, e.g., MAx WEBBER,
SCIENCE AS A VOCATION (1971).
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of the enchantments and the vulnerabilities of an overly innocent
childhood.
Another extreme view of modernity holds it to be what must be
called a psychotic mental condition, brought about among philosophers
by the humiliation they felt after the successes of the natural sciences
(particularly the ordered certainty and mathematical perfection of
Newtonian mechanics). According to this account, the humanities,
lacking corresponding successes, suffered from acute anxiety.3 Beginning
with Descartes, modern philosophers developed their characteristic
methodological skepticism in order to explain away their
embarrassment, and thus relieve their anxiety, by treating the human
condition as an intellectual difficulty. According to this view, the
medieval synthesis continues to hold insights into the nature of the
person, society, and the state. The authority of law, and therefore the
limit of the state's legitimate authority, are inseparable from the
Crucifixion and the Eucharist. These Christian events are the paradoxes
that define the comprehensive meaning of any human body, broken by
an indifferent political power. Here, the significance of Christ's death
and resurrection are not jejune fantasies. One can resist Christianity, but
in the end, its words are correct.
This Symposium plays out in the space created between these two
extreme accounts of the modern state. We are concerned with the
origins and foundations of the American form of liberal democracy. Does
either one of these two narratives offer an apt understanding of the
constitutional history and democratic theory of the United States? Are
we to view the Founders as the Third Generation of the Enlightenment,
working out a plan for a mature, competent state? Or were they
Christians, seeking to secure the dignity of the person against the
psychosis of modernity? Or, more likely, do neither of the extreme
views hold their ground. Do we need more nuanced and cautious
accounts of the relationship between Christian and modern political
thought? Accounts that are shaped by the detailed complexities of
intellectual history?
Our panelists brought a wealth of interdisciplinary perspectives to
explore the territory mapped by these questions. The first set of papers
drew from political theory. Three of the presenters are professional
political theorists: Bruce Frohnen, Barry Shain, and John Inazu. They
explored the commitments within classical liberalism that led to the
3. The psychological view of modernity was introduced by Sigmond Freud in
Civilizations and its Discontents. Stanley Cavell's The Claim of Reason advances a similar
view.
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Enlightenment and to the foundations of modern liberal democracy.
They each argued that the conceptions of limited government and
positive rights that are today identified as characteristic of liberal
democratic theory arose within and depended upon Christian
conceptions of the dignity and sinfulness of person, the nature of
authority, and the distinction (even separation) between a chiliastic
order and the state. In different ways, they suggested that the vitality of
classical liberalism today depends upon maintaining contact with these
foundational commitments, without allowing the Christian foundations
to become a civic religion.
Similarly, John Inazu explored the similarities in the thought of two
Colonial era figures, Roger Williams and William Penn, to two
contemporary political theologies, that of Howard Yoder and Stanley
Hauserwas. Inazu argued that "some significant embodiments of
conscience in the American colonies can neither be squared with
individualistic

liberalism . . . nor

appropriated

in

the

service

of

arguments that collapse the distinction between church and state." He
suggested the task of respecting the dignity of others remains a complex
issue that legal systems can only partially resolve.
A contrary perspective was advanced by the fourth speaker, Donald
R. McConnell, who disagreed with the lan shared by Frohnen, Shain,
and Inazu. McConnell took a much more favorable look at civil religion,
using the case of Perry v. Walker as his focus, he argued that liberalism
represents a rival claim to Christianity that ought to be tamed by "a new
political settlement" that can restrain rivals to Christianity "while at the
same time allowing into the public square the reasons and ideas
necessary for just civil government." For McConnell, the danger posed
by Christian rivals justifies the civil religion and a weakening of the
separation between Church and State.
A second group of essays focused more on philosophical issues,
drawing on questions of epistemology and metaphysics to explore the
contributions that religious faith can make to public discourse. John
Breen commented on remarks made by Pope Benedict XVI at
Westminster Hall in September 2010, where the pope noted that "the
role of religion in political discourse is not so much to supply [moral]
norms, as if they could not be known by non-believers,... but to help
purify and shed light upon the application of reason to the discovery of
objective moral principles." Breen's essay explored the meaning of Pope
Benedict's claim that religion helps to "purify" reason in public life and
applies these insights to the Supreme Court's recent decision in CLS v.
Martinez.
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Similarly, Michael Scaperlanda began with the theological claim
that "God poses a significant threat to [political] power because the wild
faith of the martyr cannot be tamed by civil authority." He argued that
while religion is at odds with political authority, the tension has been
resolved in the west by a democratic pluralism that draws deeply from
the Christian sources to legitimate a robust pluralism. Scaperlanda
favored religious diversity in public discourse that deepens democratic
participation.
A final group of papers focused directly on human rights. Scott
Pryor argued that Reformed theology contributed to the development of
the idea of human rights. He developed an account of rights from within
a Reformed theology, while acknowledging that "[h]armony on a single
account for human rights is not feasible in this pluralistic age." He
believed that his account of rights has several advantages to secular
accounts. Finally, Anthony Baker offered a trenchant counterpoint to the
optimistic pretensions of rights discourse. Retelling the account of
Frederick Douglass with his "master," he wove a critique of classical
liberalism's claims to be protectors of individual rights and human
dignity. He questioned the ability of Christian and secular liberalism as
systems if thought to secure the protections of persons who are
marginalized and disenfranchised.
These essays reflect the diversity of thinking about foundational
issues in contemporary social thought. The themes of limits-of reason,
faith, historicity, power, and violence-have purchase on contemporary
readers because they point toward unresolved, and perhaps
unresolvable, tensions that mark the human condition.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol33/iss3/1

4

